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Property in Human Biomaterials: Separating 
Persons & Things?* 
 
Abstract 
The traditional ‘no property’ approach of the law to human biomaterials 
has long been punctured by exceptions. Developments in the jurisprudence 
of property in human tissue in English law and beyond demonstrate that a 
variety of tissues are capable of being subject to proprietary 
considerations. Further, amongst commentators there are few who would 
deny, given biotechnological advances, that such materials can be 
considered thus. Yet where commentators do admit human biomaterials 
into the realm of property it is often done with an emphasis on some sort of 
separation from the person who is the source of those materials. One line of 
argument suggests that there is a difference between persons and things 
which constitutes a morally justifiable distinction when it comes to 
property. This article examines whether the idea of separability can do the 
work of demarcating those objects that ought to be considered property 
from those that ought not to be. It argues that, despite the entailment of a 
separability criterion inherent in both the statutory and common law 
positions, and the support given to this by some commentators, it is 
philosophically problematic as the basis for delineating property in human 
tissue and other biomaterials. 
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/ojls/gqs018  
 
1. Introduction 
A particular line of objection to the body and human biomaterials as 
property could be captured in the claim that only ‘things’ can be the proper 
objects of property, and that the human body and human biomaterials do 
not qualify for entry into this category of things. This line of reasoning 
maintains that there is a difference between persons and things (or between 
things derived from the human body and other types of things) which 
constitutes a morally justifiable distinction when it comes to property. Such 
commentators do not think that the owner and owned can be the same and 
as such deny full self-ownership. For example, Jonathan Herring and P.-L. 
Chau maintain that: 
There may be a logical problem in saying that we own 
ourselves. That is, there needs to be a clear separation between 
‘the owner’ and ‘the owned’. We can only say we own our 
bodies if we see a clear distinction between ‘us’ and ‘our 
bodies’. 1 
                                                 
* I would like to thank Sara Fovargue, Jonathan Herring, and Suzanne Ost for their 
comments on earlier drafts of this article. I would also like to thank the various audiences 
who have have given me invaluable comments on it; these include those at Lancaster and 
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Where commentators do admit human biomaterials into the realm of 
property it is often done with an emphasis on some sort of separation from 
the person who is the source of those materials.2 Even Margaret Radin, 
whose property for personhood theory frames certain external objects as 
being constitutive of personhood, claims that ‘property requires the notion 
of thing, and the notion of thing requires separation from self.’3 Below we 
will see that a variety of rationales underpinning the legal position 
regarding property in human tissue presuppose the idea of separability from 
persons and would need to go hand in hand with it in order to stand. 
However, there is, as yet, not a critical body of work addressing the 
philosophical reasoning and arguments that are entailed in using a 
separability criterion as capable of delineating property. As such, this article 
looks at the contention that separability can do the work of delineating 
those objects that ought to be considered property from those that ought not 
to be. I argue that, despite the entailment of a separability criterion inherent 
in both the statutory and common law positions, and the support given to 
this by some commentators, with regards to human tissue, separability is 
philosophically problematic as the basis for delineating property from non-
property. Although the notion of separation from persons is used to try to 
exclude the whole embodied person and certain separated body parts from 
the realm of property, it cannot do the normative work that its proponents 
would like in this respect. 
 
2. Property in human tissue: Becoming a res? 
The traditional approach of the law to property in human tissue can be 
summed up by the ‘no property’ rule; that is, the body is res nullius (a thing 
belonging to no-one). This was originally applied in the context of the 
deceased body4 and had become established in English case law by the 
                                                                                                                           
Keele law schools, the Oxford University workshop on Legal Principles Underlying the 
Law on Storage of Human Tissue, the Centre for Ethics in Medicine at the University of 
Bristol, the 60th Political Studies Association Annual Conference, and also my colleagues 
at the University of Manchester. 
1
 J Herring, P-L Chau, ‘My Body, Your Body, Our Bodies’ (2007) 15 Med Law Rev 34, 
43. Although one could argue that the problem is not even a logical one, but merely one of 
convention or linguistics. 
2
 See, for example, JE Penner, The Idea of Property in Law (OUP 1997), 111; JW Harris, 
Property and Justice (OUP 2001), 353; and R Hardcastle, Law and the Human Body: 
Property Rights, Ownership, and Control (Hart 2009), 15.  
3
 M Radin, Reinterpreting Property (University of Chicago Press: 1993), 41. 
4
 See the comments of Sir Edward Coke ‘The burial of the Cadaver (that is, caro data 
vermibus) is nullis in bonis, and belongs to Ecclesiastical cognizance.’ E Coke, The Third 
Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England: Concerning High Treason, and other Pleas 
of the Crown, and Criminal Causes (London 1669), 203 (3 Co. Inst. 203). See also the 
Haynes’ Case (1614) 77 ER 1389. For a critique of the origins of this rule see JK Mason & 
GT Laurie ‘Consent or Property? Dealing with the Body and its Parts in the Shadow of 
Bristol and Alder Hey’ MLR 64 (2001) 710, 714 and RN Nwabueze, ‘Legal paradigms of 
human tissue’ in C Lenk, N Hoppe, K Beier, & C Wiesmann (eds) Human Tissue 
Research: A European Perspective on Ethical & Legal Challenges (OUP 2011), 87. 
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nineteenth century.5 However, the rule has long since been punctured by 
exceptions,6 with the result that the old legal dictum is becoming ever more 
redundant. The increasing obsolescence of the no property rule is apparent 
if we look at the development of the jurisprudence of property in human 
tissue in England and Wales and beyond. Amongst these are legal 
determinations of property in biomaterials in order to facilitate prosecutions 
in theft,7 to establish legitimate entitlements to possess tissue samples for 
research and other ends,8 as a means to permitting remedial action and 
compensation for damage done,9 and, most recently, in order to permit 
possession of sperm for the purposes of in-vitro fertilisation.10 Furthermore, 
a variety of tissues have been deemed to be subject to proprietary 
considerations when removed from both deceased and living bodies.  
Inherent in the different judicial decisions is the notion of the 
transformation of human biomaterials from a res nullius into a res (thing) 
capable of being governed by property relations. While the predominant 
rationale employed in the judgements invokes the so-called work and skill 
exception,11 there is, as yet, no apparent generalisable account of the types 
of activities which can trigger the transformation of biomaterials from a res 
nullius to a res. One unifying feature, at least until recently, was the fact 
that the only person who could not come to own human biomaterials was 
their source; that is, the person themselves. However, three contemporary 
cases (Jonathan Yearworth and Others v. North Bristol NHS Trust,12 
Bazley v Wesley Monash IVF Pty Ltd,13 and Jocelyn Edwards; Re the estate 
of the late Mark Edwards14) challenge this. They also call into question the 
work and skill exception, which, in their wake, can no longer be seen as the 
principal basis for the creation of property rights in human tissue. We will 
see below that, even though the jurisprudence in this area is still developing 
and the move away from the work and skill exception is to be welcomed, 
the various rationales employed are predicated on the problematic 
                                                 
5
 During this period it was cited in R v Lynn (1788) 2 T R 394, R v Sharpe (1857) 169 ER 
959, Foster v Dodd (1866) LQ 1 QB 475, (1867) LR 3 QB 67, R v Price (1884) 12 QBD 
247, and Williams v Williams (1881-85) All ER 840. 
6
 See also RN Nwabueze, Biotechnology and the Challenge of Property (Ashgate 2007), 
44-5. Here Nwabueze indicates that it may have been nineteenth century judicial morality 
which led to the no property rule gaining the foothold it did, but that prior to that it was 
possible for a corpse to be considered as property. 
7
 See R v Herbert (1961) 25 JCL 163, R v Welsh (1974) RTR 478, R v Rothery [1976] RTR 
550, (1976) 63 Cr App R 231, and R v Kelly and Lindsay [1998] 3 All ER 741. The first 
three cases involved living persons and involved the theft of hair, blood, and urine 
respectively, while the last case involved the appropriation of deceased body parts from the 
Royal College of Surgeons. 
8
 Doodeward v Spence 6 CLR 406, AB & Others v Leeds Teaching Hospital NHS Trust 
EWHC 644, Moore v Regents of the University of California 51 Cal.3d 120, Greenberg v 
Miami Children’s Hospital Research Institute 264 F.Sup2d 1064 (SD Fla, 2003), and 
Washington University v William J. Catalona 490 F.3d 667. 
9
 Jonathan Yearworth and Others v. North Bristol NHS Trust [2009] EWCA Civ 37.   
10
 Jocelyn Edwards; Re the estate of the late Mark Edwards [2011] NSWSC 478. 
11
 Doodeward v Spence 6 CLR 406. 
12
 Yearworth (n 9). 
13
 [2010] QSC 118. 
14
 Edwards (n 10). 
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requirement of separation from persons. I first examine some of the relevant 
decisions and the potential underlying principles governing them, 
concluding that separability is seen as transforming human tissue into a res 
and facilitating the creation of property rights. Then I move on to elucidate 
exactly why reliance on such a criterion is problematic.  
 
A. Accepting exceptions: Work & skill 
In relation to tissue from the deceased the first recent case of note is R v 
Kelly and Lindsay.15 In this case the defendants had been prosecuted for the 
theft of body parts from the Royal College of Surgeons. Kelly was an artist 
and Lindsay a junior technician at the Royal College. At Kelly’s request, 
Lindsay obtained numerous body parts from the College so that they could 
be cast into moulds for sculptures. These included ‘three human heads, part 
of a brain, six arms or parts of an arm, ten legs or feet, and part of three 
human torsos’.16 None of these were returned to the College and some were 
subsequently found buried in a field near Kelly’s family home, some in the 
attic of his own home, and some in the basement of a friend’s flat.17 The 
defendants appealed their prosecution, claiming that (1) the body parts 
could not be considered property for the purposes of the Theft Act 1968 and 
(2) the Royal College was not in lawful possession of the body parts. 
Consequent on these, the appellants argued that they could not, therefore, 
be held to have stolen the body parts from the College.18 It was of the 
opinion of the Court, however, that:  
. . . parts of a corpse are capable of being property within s.4 of 
the Theft Act, if they have acquired different attributes by 
virtue of the application of skill, such as dissection or 
preservation techniques, for exhibition or teaching purposes.19  
The Court accepted that these particular specimens would have been the 
subject of ‘many hours, sometimes weeks, of skilled work’20 and had, 
therefore, acquired different attributes.21 In coming to this conclusion, the 
Court relied on the judgement in Doodeward v Spence, an Australian case 
from the turn of the last century.22 Here it was determined that: 
[W]hen a person has by the lawful exercise of work or skills so 
dealt with a human body or part of a human body in his lawful 
possession that it has acquired some attributes differentiating it 
from a mere corpse awaiting burial, he acquires a right to 
retain possession of it, at least as against any person not entitled 
to have delivered to him for the purpose of burial . . .23 
                                                 
15
 [1999] Q.B. 621. 
16




 Ibid. 622. 
19
 Ibid 631[My emphasis]. 
20
 Ibid. 624. 
21
 Ibid 621. 
22
 6 CLR 406. 
23
 Ibid 414 [My emphasis]. 
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Thus, the action of work or skill on the body (part) is somehow 
transformative, changing its status and distinguishing it from an ordinary 
corpse. 
In one respect this judgement in Kelly would seem to be out of 
keeping with that of Dobson v North Tyneside Health Authority24 two years 
previously. Here Gibson LJ held that a brain preserved in paraffin for the 
purposes of a coroner’s investigation had not become property.25 Yet, in 
Dobson it was also noted that: 
There is nothing in the pleading or evidence before us to 
suggest that the actual preservation of the brain after the post 
mortem was on a par with stuffing or embalming a corpse or 
preserving an anatomical or pathological specimen for a 
scientific collection or with preserving a human freak such as a 
double-headed foetus that had some value for exhibition 
purposes.26  
Rose LJ in Kelly took this as an indication that Gibson had in fact accepted 
the general proposition that the application of work or skill could be 
transformative in respect of the body and its parts.27 It is not clear from the 
judgement in Dobson, however, whether the difference was a matter of 
degree in respect of the work and skill applied (it presumably taking more 
of each to prepare prosections of body parts than to fix a brain in paraffin) 
or whether it lies in the intended use that the specimen is to be put to (there 
being no intention to preserve beyond certain uses within the coroner’s 
jurisdiction in Dobson). The ruling in the later case of AB and Others v 
Leeds Teaching Hospital NHS Trust28 upheld the Doodeward exception. In 
the case the parents of deceased children, whose organs and tissues had 
been retained without their knowledge following post-mortem, brought an 
action for psychiatric injury and wrongful interference with the bodies of 
the deceased children.29 Here the Court seemed to think that the degree of 
work and skill applied to organs and tissue samples does have a bearing on 
the issue with Gage J noting that: 
[T]o dissect and fix an organ from a child's body requires work 
and a great deal of skill . . . The subsequent production of 
blocks and slides is also a skilful operation requiring work and 
expertise of trained scientists.30 
This seems to have been considered as a sufficient condition for rights of 
possession to have been created regardless of intention regarding future use 
beyond the direct purposes of the post-mortem examinations: ‘the [hospital] 
pathologists became entitled to possess the organs, the blocks and slides’.31  
What is less clear-cut is whether, in the absence of the same level of work 
                                                 
24
 [1997] 1 W.L.R. 596. 
25
 Ibid 601 
26
 Dobson (n 24) 601. 
27
 Kelly (n 15) 631. 
28
 (2004) EWHC 644 (QB). 
29
 Ibid 12. 
30
 Ibid 148. 
31
 Ibid 156. 
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or skill, intention to possess or use the organs, tissue blocks, and slides 
would be enough to confer such possessory rights. 
The work and skill exception also gives rise to other questions which 
seem to be problematic, philosophically at least. In being an exception to 
the supposed general ‘no property’ rule, it would appear to rest on the 
assumption that the tissue was, prior to work and skill being applied, always 
unowned.32 Yet, such a view, as Price notes, has implications for organ 
donation and research involving human tissue.33 If a person’s organs and 
tissues do not belong to them, how can they legitimately donate them? An 
alternative view is that the tissue in question was abandoned, but implicit in 
the notion of abandonment is that of prior ownership.34 Furthermore, given 
the fact that it is notoriously difficult to prove abandonment of goods in 
English law,35 it is far from clear why we would presume abandonment in 
these cases. Questions also arise over how the application of work and skill 
brings about the transformation of tissue from res nullius to a res which is 
the subject of property rights, what the exact nature of the transformation is, 
and, indeed, if any transformation at all must take place.36 Despite all of 
this, the work and skill exception has since become embedded in statute 
when it was written into the Human Tissue Act 2004; S. 32(9)(c) exempts 
‘material which is the subject of property because of the application of 
human skill’ from the provisions of the Act. Nonetheless, while the 
potential problems with the exception are noteworthy, ultimately they arise 
after the central issue with which I am concerned here. Furthermore, the 
somewhat questionable character of the work and skill exception has been 
recognised by the courts and other potentially more solid grounds for the 
ascription of property rights, as discussed below, are emerging. 
 
B. Beyond the work & skill exception: The sperm cases 
It is interesting to note, in Doodeward, the comments of Griffiths CJ 
immediately preceding those regarding the application of work and skill; he 
says that ‘a human body, or a portion of a human body, is capable by law of 
becoming the subject of property.’37 He further comments that ‘[i]t is not 
necessary to give an exhaustive enumeration of the circumstances under 
which such a right may be acquired’.38 Instead he focuses on the grounds 
upon which he thinks property has been created for the purposes of the case 
                                                 
32
 See D Dickenson, Property in the Body (CUP 2007), 3 and D Price, Human Tissue in 
Transplantation and Research (CUP 2010), 249-250. 
33
 Price (n 32) 250. 
34
 Ibid 251-252. 
35
 See, for example, the illuminating discussion in S Thomas, ‘Do Freegans Commit 
Theft?’ (2010) 30 Legal Studies 98, 104-114. He argues that, while abandonment is 
possible in common law, a variety of factors render it difficult to determine if it has 
occurred; ‘[t]hese are the value of the goods, the owner’s intention, the location of the 
goods and the finder’s intention’ (105). 
36
 For an excellent discussion of some of these aspects, including how the exception might 
be interpreted within existing theories of property see Price (n 32) 249-64. 
37
 Doodeward (n 22) 414. 
38
 Ibid. 
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at hand: which for him is the application of work and skill. This suggests 
that even though Doodeward has been credited with establishing narrow 
and somewhat dubious circumstances in which human tissue is capable of 
being property, the decision does not actually exclude other grounds for 
creating property in human tissue. This was also recognised in Kelly when 
Rose LJ noted that ‘the common law does not stand still’39 and that, in the 
future, human tissue might be deemed to be property even where there has 
been no application of work or skill ‘if they have a use or significance 
beyond their mere existence.’40 These comments seem to have presaged the 
more recent cases in relation to the jurisprudence of property in human 
tissue which have gone beyond the work and skill exception. 
Three cases are significant in this respect: Jonathan Yearworth and 
Others v. North Bristol NHS Trust (England and Wales),41 
Bazley v Wesley Monash IVF Pty Ltd,42 and Jocelyn Edwards; Re the estate 
of the late Mark Edwards (both Australia).43 The relevant tissue in all three 
cases is sperm, with the first dealing with the common law’s approach 
when stored samples were irrevocably damaged and the latter two with the 
disposition of stored sperm where the source of the samples had died. In 
Yearworth five men and the administratrix of a sixth brought an action 
against the North Bristol NHS Trust for damage done to semen.44 The 
samples had been stored because the men were to undergo chemotherapy 
treatment which might have left them infertile. However, the storage system 
at the Bristol Southmead fertility unit failed and the samples perished. The 
Court of Appeal adopted a novel approach to dealing with human tissue by 
ruling that the semen could be considered to be property for the purposes of 
the claim before the court and, as a result, that the men had grounds for an 
action in bailment.45 The case is significant not only in examining the facts 
through the law of bailment, but also for the basis upon which is found that 
the sperm was capable of being subject to property rights.46 While the court 
admitted that it could have concluded that the sperm was property because 
there was an application of work and skill involved in freezing the samples 
in liquid nitrogen, instead it reasoned that: 
[W]e are not content to see the common law in this area 
founded upon the principle in Doodeward, which was devised 
as an exception to a principle, itself of exceptional character, 
relating to the ownership of a human corpse. Such ancestry 
does not commend it as a solid foundation.47 
                                                 
39
 Kelly (n 15) 631. 
40
 Ibid [My emphasis]. Specifically, he said ‘[t]his may be so if, for example, they are 
intended for use in an organ transplant operation, for the extraction of DNA or, for that 
matter, as an exhibit in a trial.’  
41
 Yearworth (n 9). 
42
 Bazley (n 13). 
43
 Edwards (n 10). 
44
 I use the terms ‘sperm’ and ‘semen’ interchangeably, although it should be noted that it 
is the sperm contained in the semen which is the tissue of relevance. 
45
 Yearworth (n 9) 47. 
46
 See M Quigley, ‘Property: The Future of Human Tissue?’ (2009) 17 Med Law Rev 457. 
47
 Yearworth (n 9) 45(d). 
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In conjunction with the fact that the sperm was a product of the men’s own 
bodies, the court took as key the control the men had over their sperm 
subject to the provisions of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 
1990.48 In so doing, this case sets out a ‘broader basis’49 for the 
determination of ownership of tissue samples or, at the very least, sperm 
samples. The position of the court in Yearworth was subsequently followed 
in the two Australian cases.50 Bazley v Wesley Monash IVF Pty Ltd,51 
involved a request by an administratrix that an IVF unit continue to store a 
sample of her deceased husband’s sperm which had been stored prior to 
him undergoing chemotherapy. The court ruled that the samples could be 
considered to be the property of the deceased and that a bailment existed. 
Furthermore, it held that this also applied to his personal representatives.52 
The second case, Jocelyn Edwards; Re the estate of the late Mark 
Edwards,53 proceeded along similar lines. In this case Mrs Edwards and her 
husband already had an appointment to discuss IVF treatment, but the day 
before it was due Mr Edwards had a fatal accident. The application to the 
court was for a declaration that Mrs Edwards was entitled, as administrator 
of the deceased’s estate, to the possession of sperm which had been 
extracted in the hospital after his death. The court, relying on Bazley and 
cases from other jurisdictions such as Yearworth found that while not 
binding those rulings were ‘collectively, persuasive of the view that the law 
should recognise the possibility of sperm being regarded as property, in 
certain circumstances’.54 The circumstances in Edwards were that the sperm 
has been removed and stored for reproductive treatment. Although Hulme J 
limited his findings and did not see the need to probe the law in the area for 
the purposes of the case in front of him,55 this decision does not rule out 




3. Property & the normative work of separability? 
Property can usefully and convincingly be identified as a set of rules 
governing the relations between persons with regards to certain objects56 
                                                 
48
 Ibid 45(f). The 2008 amendments were not yet in force the time of the ruling, but would 
not have had any substantive effect on the judgement in any case. For more on this see 
Quigley, (n 46) 462-3 and S Devaney, ‘Tissue Providers for Stem Cell Research: The 
Dispossessed’ (2010) 2 Law, Innovation, and Technology 165, 184. 
49
 Yearworth (n 9) 45(e). 
50
 For a full analysis of the two Australian cases see L Skene, ‘Proprietary interests in 
human bodily material: Yearworth, recent Australian cases on stored semen and their 
implications’ (2012) Med Law Rev. Advanced access, doi: 10.1093/medlaw/fws001. 
51
 Bazley (n 13). 
52
 Ibid 33. 
53
 Edwards (n 10). 
54




 In positing this view I reject, as a matter of logic, the claim that property relations can 
obtain between persons and things. Such a view could be imputed, for example, from 
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and, as such, consists of a bundle of jural relations. The view of property as 
a bundle of (legal) relations is based on what can be termed the Hohfeld-
Honoré analysis of property.57 This means of conceptualising property 
brings together Wesley Hohfeld’s language of rights58 (claim, 
privilege/liberty,59 power, and immunity60) and A.M. Honoré’s incidents of 
ownership.61 These incidents are the right to possess, the right to use, the 
right to manage, the right to the income of the thing, the right to the capital, 
the right to security, the rights of transmissibility and absence of term, the 
prohibition of harmful use, liability to execution,62 and the incident of 
residuarity.63 They are thus not limited to claim-rights and/or liberty-rights, 
but include a variety of other legal relations: liabilities, powers, and 
immunities. All of these, however, are not strictly necessary for property 
since those constituents which comprise the core of ownership can be 
differentiated from any adjunctive rules. These, although part of most 
property institutions, do not form analytically intrinsic elements of property 
or ownership interests. According to J.W. Harris: 
Privileges and powers are intrinsic elements of ownership 
interests. Claim-rights, duties, liabilities, and immunities are 
important concomitants of ownership interests but are not 
analytically intrinsic to ownership interests in resources 
(material or ideational).64 
Thus, Harris’ conception jettisons the claim-rights, immunities, and 
liabilities that are contained within Honoré’s schema of ownership. These 
                                                                                                                           
Harris who argued that ownership interests ‘involve a juridical relationship between a 
person (or group) and a resource’ (Harris (n 2), 5). However, since objects or things cannot 
be the bearers of the rights, or indeed correlative duties, that complex property relations 
involve, it does not make sense to conceive of them as anything other than person-person 
relations. In this manner, persons can be said to stand in relation to things, but this is not 
the same as claiming that those relations obtain between persons and things. See J 
Waldron, The Right to Private Property (Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1988) 27. 
57
 WN Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions of a Right as Applied in Judicial 
Reasoning (Yale University Press 1919, reprinted 1966) and AM Honoré, ‘Ownership’ in 
AG Guest (ed) Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence (OUP 1961). See also Waldron (n 55) 47-
53, SR Munzer, A Theory of Property (CUP 1990) 17-27, and LC Becker, Property Rights: 
Philosophic Foundations (Routledge & Keegan Paul 1980) ch. 2. 
58
 Hohfeld (n 56). 
59
 Note that many commentators use the term ‘liberty’ in place of the Hohfeldian 
‘privilege’. Here I use the terms interchangeably. Additionally, we should note that 
Hohfeld thought that only claim-rights are rights ‘in the strictest sense’ (Ibid 36). 
60
 For a good explanation of the Hohfeldian analytical system see L Wenar, ‘Rights’ in EN 
Zalta (ed), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2010 Edition). The four 
positions, as set out by Wenar, are: (1) A has a claim that B φ if and only if B has a duty to 
A to φ, (2) A has a privilege to φ if and only if A has no duty not to φ, (3) A has a power if 
and only if A has the ability within a set of rules to alter her own or another's Hohfeldian 
incidents, and (4) B has an immunity if and only if A lacks the ability within a set of rules 
to alter B's Hohfeldian incidents (see sections 2.1.1-2.1.4). 
61
 Honoré (n 56). 
62
 This is the liability that owners have for their debts with respect to their property. 
63
 This incident recognises that property rights can expire or be abandoned and that when 
they do they can become vested in other parties. 
64
 Harris (n 2) 128. Note that ‘privilege’ is Hohfeld’s preferred term (n 56), whereas many 
commentators use the word ‘liberty’. Here I use the terms interchangeably. 
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concomitants of ownership comprise those rules which, although generally 
found in property systems, are not constitutive of ownership itself. Since 
Honoré was trying to capture the general nature of property systems and the 
functioning of property institutions, his account includes elements which 
are ordinarily associated with ownership, but are not inherent to it.65 
Regarded in this manner, the locus of property and ownership lies in rights 
of use and control (use-privileges and control-powers);66 it recognises and 
protects a particular way of controlling certain resources. Those who 
support the notion of property in the body believe that individuals ought to 
have this type of control over their bodies or, at least, over their separated 
biomaterials. As Jesse Wall notes: 
[T]he ability of a person to possess, use, manage and alienate 
objects—to have some control of the world around them—is 
fundamental to a person’s preference satisfaction, their 
autonomous life or the expression of their personhood. This is 
particularly the case when the object is (or was) as personal as 
a part of their body.67 
In this respect, there are parallels to be drawn between the type of control 
that we can be said to have over our property and the exclusive use that 
individuals have in determining what is done with, or indeed to, their 
bodies.68  
Despite the obvious parallels regarding use and control, it has been 
argued that in order for something to be considered as being property it 
must be outwith the person. There must be normative boundary which 
separates persons from the rest of the world. Margaret Radin talks of a 
‘perceptible boundary’,69 while Harris claims that there must be a 
‘necessary distancing between human source and owned object’.70 
Similarly, Rohan Hardcastle maintains that ‘it is clear that for a thing to be 
the subject of property rights it must be distanced from human subjects.’71 
Various criteria have been suggested as appropriate for making the 
delineation between property and non-property; for example, 
transferability,72 detachment,73 distancing,74 and separability.75 Thus, in 
setting such a criterion, only objects which can meet it can be permitted into 
the realm of property. In the case of body parts and human biomaterials, 
meeting the criterion is seen as bringing about a transformation from person 
to thing, thereby changing the status of these from non-property to property 
(or at least into objects capable of being subject to property rights). Yet, the 
question of detachment, distancing, or separability from persons only 
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becomes an issue when thinking about things such as human biomaterials. 
It is not something that we need to consider when subjecting other items, 
like houses and cars, to a property analysis.  
It is clear from my brief examination of the development of the 
jurisprudence regarding property and the body that the body and its parts 
have been, and continue to be, treated as property for a variety of legal 
purposes.76 The rationales underpinning the various decisions are predicated 
on the notion that the human body and biomaterials must undergo some sort 
of transformation in order to become a res (thing). In becoming a res their 
character is seemingly altered in a legally (and perhaps morally) significant 
manner, rendering them the subject of property(-type) rights of use and 
control. In the earlier cases (Doodeward, Kelly, and AB v Leeds) this 
transformation could be seen as relying on the work/skill exception and, 
therefore, as being an especially tangible conversion. Yet the later sperm 
cases, in not relying on the exception, indicate that there is something else 
doing important normative work. Whatever the contextualised set of 
circumstances or conditions required for the creation and acquisition of 
property rights in human tissue, all presuppose the separability of these 
materials from persons. Hardcastle notes a distinction is to be made 
between things that are actually subject to property rights and those which 
are merely capable of being subject to them.77 In this vein, separability 
functions as a bright line which must be crossed as a prerequisite for the 
transformation to res to take place. Even though something else needs to 
occur to actually create those property rights, crossing the normative line 
seems to render human tissue capable of being governed by property 
considerations. Judicial support for this can be found in Yearworth when 
the Court maintained that ‘a living human body is incapable of being 
owned.’78 Further to this, the decision in R v Bentham79 was cited to 
demonstrate that ‘a person does not even ‘possess’ his body or any part of 
it’.80 Of specific relevance in Bentham are Lord Bingham’s comments that: 
One cannot possess something which is not separate and 
distinct from oneself. An unsevered hand or finger is part of 
oneself. Therefore, one cannot possess it . . . What is possessed 
must under definition be a thing. A person’s hand or fingers are 
not a thing.81 
As such, some sort of a separation or separability criterion appears to be in 
operation by the courts and seems to be pivotal in deciding whether 
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something is even capable of being the appropriate subject of property 
rights.  
James Penner offers as a defining feature of the objects of property a 
separability thesis. He says that: 
Only those ‘things’ in the world which are contingently 
associated with any particular owner may be the objects of 
property; as a function of the nature of this contingency, in 
theory nothing of normative consequence beyond the fact that 
the ownership has changed occurs when an object is alienated 
to another.82  
He also refers to this as the thinghood of objects of property.83 His claim is 
that an object of property must be ‘separate and distinct from any person 
who might hold it’84 The contingency claim is a way of saying that the 
object lacks some sort of relevant connection with the person and it ‘might 
just as well be someone else’s’85; that ‘there is nothing special about my 
ownership of a particular [item]’.86 He identifies two senses of separability; 
one centres on the identity of owner and the other on the owned thing 
itself.87 The first sense sees separability as involving the termination of an 
individual’s relationship with their property. When this happens the 
(former) owner does not undergo or experience any substantive changes in 
identity or personality as a result of this. The second sense of separability 
has its focus in the alienation of the thing to another where the person who 
acquires the object, and the corresponding property rights, has 
fundamentally the same relationship to the thing.88 These senses correspond 
to two questions that can be asked in order to examine how separability can 
identify property: (1) ‘is the owner still the same person if he no longer has 
this thing because it is taken away from him or destroyed?’89 and (2) ‘does a 
different person who takes on the relationship to the thing stand in 
essentially the same position as the first person?’90 It is the second question 
that Penner believes is pertinent. He dismisses the first because he thinks it 
does not help to distinguish property relations from other types of relations; 
whereas the second question can help in identifying property relations, 
particularly in hard cases. The body is just one of these hard cases and 
Penner contends that analysing it within the framework posed by the second 
question helps to illuminate matters. As such, the rest of this paper will be 
devoted to probing the hard case of the body and asking whether some 
notion of separability (and indeed contingency) can do the normative work 
that its proponents claim it does. 
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4. Separability, persons, & the body 
Asking the (purportedly) relevant question with regards to the contingency 
of a person’s relationship to their body prompts the question of whether 
another person could stand in relation to one’s body, or part thereof, in the 
same way as the first person. With respect to the whole person, Penner 
thinks that the body is not property. He contends that: 
[T]he relationship of property dictates the absolute control of 
the owner over the thing  . . . and the corresponding absence of 
any ‘control’ of the thing over the owner. This entails that the 
owner can rid himself of a thing that he holds as property. This 
is not the case with our bodies. We are stuck in, or to, but 
certainly, with them.91 
Hence, for Penner, the whole living body, the embodied person, ought not 
to be considered as property since we are ‘stuck with them’. We cannot 
separate ourselves from our lives and personalities and, thus, we cannot 
own ourselves or our bodies. Since being in a property relationship entails 
that someone else might just as well have owned the thing in question, it 
makes no sense to talk of owning our bodies.92 Still it is not correct to claim 
that we cannot separate ourselves from our lives and personalities or that 
we are stuck with our bodies; death would seem to be the prime candidate 
for an event which puts distance between the person and their body.93 It 
severs the relevant connection that (former) persons have with their bodies 
as a whole. Since the pre-mortem person has already been extinguished, the 
corpse can be seen as already disconnected from any person or personality. 
Penner even says as much himself: 
[A] corpse has no necessary attachment to any living human. 
So it can be as much the subject of a property right as anything 
else.94 
Despite this, we treat the corpse as if it were ‘still attached to a self’ and our 
treatment of the dead is affected by the person that used to exist.95 Be that as 
it may, while we might act in a manner that is respectful towards the 
deceased, this does not mean that the corpse is still attached to a self in any 
substantive sense. As Price observes: 
[S]ymbolic power and difficulties of psychological 
reorientation cannot preserve ‘self’ even if the person’s identity 
lives, for others, in their minds after physical death has 
ensued.96 
One might respond to this by arguing that persons do in fact have a variety 
of interests which persist beyond death anchoring the deceased body to the 
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former person.97 The existence of such posthumous interests is 
philosophically contentious;98 however, even if we accept that a person’s 
interests survive beyond their death this does not have a bearing on the 
issue of separability and property. If interests do endure beyond the grave 
then the relevant consideration in this respect is whether they may be 
wrongfully damaged.99 Joel Feinberg describes posthumous harm as ‘the 
objective blocking of goals and thwarting of desires’.100 Thus, harm might 
occur where the body of the deceased (or parts thereof) is used in a manner 
incompatible with the interests of the ante-mortem person. Even so, 
recognising that the deceased body becomes, or is capable of being, 
property need not be harmful to the interests of the deceased. Potential 
posthumous harms to interests have something to do with the property 
question only insofar as they might be relevant to property writ large; we 
might just as easily thwart these interests through the disposal of the 
deceased’s house as through the disposition of their body. As such, nothing 
in the idea surviving interests speaks against a person’s relationship to their 
body being contingent in the sense required for the separability thesis. 
Moreover, it is not obvious that asking the purportedly relevant 
question of whether third parties, who take on a relationship to the deceased 
body, stand in the same position as the former person advances the 
situation. If this is a metaphysical question about whether they can come to 
inhabit the deceased’s body and utilise it as they did, the answer is patently 
no. In any case this is an unlikely interpretation of the requirement; 
therefore, if it is a question about whether others can come to acquire the 
use and control rights that formerly inhered in the deceased, the answer 
might be different. There is nothing, literally or conceptually, that makes it 
impossible for these rights to transfer to others upon death. The separability 
thesis in itself gives us no reason to reject property in the deceased body. 
Thus, if we want to deny property in the deceased body we need to find a 
different justification. 
The separability criterion also needs to be questioned in relation to 
parts of the living body, such as organs, tissues, and cells. Biomedical 
advances and technology has made possible their separation from the 
whole. This separation puts literal distance between the person and their 
(former) body part, making the association between them merely a 
conditional one. This element of conditionality or contingency is required 
on Penner’s account of property (in the body). He thus suggests that body 
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parts can be conceived of as property so long as the removal of particular 
parts does not essentially alter the person: 
If . . . science proves capable of disconnecting an organ so that 
one remains essentially the same person, as is the case with a 
kidney, we can regard such an organ as a contingent material 
possession, and therefore one’s property.101  
This analysis presents at least two problems. First, it is difficult to see what 
claim is being made here. Is it a moral claim about personal identity? If so 
the implication would be that it is not permissible to remove organs, tissues, 
or body parts where to do so would fundamentally change the person. If 
such a claim is to stand then the portion of it doing the normative work is 
the latter part. If this is correct, the wider assertion must be that it is wrong 
not just to remove body parts, but to do anything which would 
fundamentally alter one as a person. As we will see below, we do not need 
to delve into any particular theory of persons or personal identity to see that 
this is problematic. Secondly, it is not obvious whether the claim being 
made is a literal or a conceptual claim about separability; does separability 
entail actual separation from the person or that objects be merely 
separable? Each interpretation raises its own problems.  
 
A. Separate or separable? 
One interpretation of the separability thesis would be to take separability as 
meaning an organ or piece of tissue which is capable of being separated 
from the whole person. Provided a particular part of the body is capable of 
being removed then it can be considered as property. For example, small 
tissue samples which are taken for biopsy would be property; even whole 
organs, such as a kidney, a lobe of a liver, a lung. In addition, other parts 
such as fingers and toes or even whole limbs could be considered thus. 
Actual removal on this view would not be necessary, just the technological 
possibility. However, one might point out that almost every organ, tissue, 
and cell in the human body is, thanks to modern surgery, capable of being 
removed. For this reason, this interpretation is likely to be too expansive for 
those who do not want to admit property in whole organs or in situ tissues, 
since it might actually permit property in the whole body. Penner refers to 
separability as a conceptual criterion102 which suggests this interpretation, 
but at the same time tempers his argument with more pragmatic leaning 
claims, saying: 
I would be the same person if I lost one of my limbs, or if my 
relationship to a friend was severed because that friend died, 
but my relationship to my limbs and my friends are not 
property relationships.103 
Therefore, it might be that the particular body part in question needs to be 
not merely separable, but that it must be actually separated from the body. 
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This version of the criterion seems to be at work in both the relevant case 
law and the comments of other theorists. Lord Bingham in R v Bentham 
stated that objects under property consideration must be ‘separate and 
distinct from oneself.’104 Furthermore, Harris and Hardcastle argue for a 
‘distancing’ between the subjects and objects of property rights.105 Harris 
rejects the notion of ownership or property in the whole body and claims 
that when self-ownership is invoked it is the clearest example of the 
distancing requirement being overlooked.106 However, he contends that 
persons should be thought of as owning their separated body parts107 and 
that there is ‘no conceptual difficulty’108 in them being conceived of as 
property, because once separation has taken place there is the ‘necessary 
distancing between human source and owned object’.109 Harris does not 
elaborate on the ‘distancing’ aspect of his claim save that it must be 
something that a person ‘could be seen to control or use as ‘owner’.’110 
Nevertheless it does not advance the situation if those things which are 
considered to be subject to property rights are described in this manner. 
Clearly an individual could be seen as owner with respect to something 
which is capable of being owned, but we first need a way of identifying 
such items. To define the objects in relation to the owner presupposes that 
the thing can in fact be owned, but determining what can be owned is meant 
to be the purpose of the criterion.  
In order to think about separability (or distancing) as actual 
separation, consider the following: Jane is in end stage renal failure and 
urgently requires a kidney transplant. As chance would have it, Jane’s 
husband Peter is willing to donate one of his kidneys and is also a good 
match. Jane and Peter attend the transplant unit at the local hospital where 
successful retrieval and transplant operations take place. If the separability 
thesis is to be interpreted in terms of ‘separate’, the implication is that prior 
to Peter going into hospital and even as he lies anaesthetised, but still intact, 
on the operating table, the kidney is not property (Peter’s or anyone else’s). 
Yet, once the kidney is physically removed from his body by the transplant 
surgeon and is lying in a sterile dish beside him, it is property. After that, 
once the kidney is taken to the adjoining operating theatre and becomes part 
and parcel of Jane’s body, no longer being separate from a person, it is 
again no longer capable of being governed by property relations. Such a 
situation raises interesting challenges.  
First, and foremost, it prompts us to ask whose property the kidney is 
while it is detached from Peter. The answer we might want to give is that it 
is Peter’s property. This would be Harris’ answer since he says ‘if some 
part of a body becomes separated, by surgery or otherwise, its human 
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source ought to be recognized as its owner.’111 But if this is correct, what 
generated Peter’s claim to the kidney? His claim could stem from the fact 
that the kidney resided in his body only moments previously; however, we 
also need to think about the property rights that have now been created 
where no such rights existed before. How would these rights, seemingly 
created ex nihilo, be different to the rights of control that Peter had just 
moments previously? There is a significant difference in the kinds of things 
that Peter can do with his kidney once it resides outside his body, but this is 
not the same as showing that his right to control its use has somehow 
changed. If the rights do not change significantly upon the removal of the 
kidney (nor, barring their transfer, when they are transplanted into Jane), it 
is not obvious why one bundle of rights ought to be conceived of as 
property, while the self-same bundle of rights is deemed not to be property 
merely as a function of the physical position of the kidney. It seems odd to 
say that we should call them one thing in vivo and another ex vivo. While 
mere oddness is not enough to show that the bundles of rights could not be 
considered differently, in the interests of coherency and consistency, it 
does, at least, cast doubt on the cogency of considering them thus.112  
 
B. Separability & the alteration of persons 
Whether the separability thesis entails actual separation or that parts be 
merely separable, the scope of the requirement seems to be quite wide. As I 
noted in relation to the deceased body, there is nothing literally or 
conceptually which would prevent another person taking on the same 
rights-relationship to organs and tissues which formerly attached to another. 
This is also the case for organs and tissues from the living body. Given this, 
in order to construct a normative boundary which narrows down the scope 
of property in the body an additional criterion must be added. According to 
Penner, property in body parts can be permitted as long as a person remains 
essentially the same after the removal of the part.113 Although, it is not clear 
what this addendum a propos persons remaining essentially the same ought 
to be taken to mean, I interpret it as meaning something like the 
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requirement that there be no significant alteration of oneself as a person. On 
this basis it is possible to distinguish between two states which might count 
as a significant alteration to the self qua person. The first would be 
substantial changes to constitutive parts of our personality, such as our 
desires, preferences, and emotional states: the personality-affecting version 
of the separability thesis. The second is any change that would completely 
deprive us of our status as persons, such as a severe injury that left us in a 
condition where we could no longer exercise any of the components that 
make up our personhood, for example, being in a permanent vegetative 
state: the personhood-affecting version. It cannot reasonably be the first of 
these that is entailed by Penner’s claim because, if the assertion is correct, it 
must encompass a wider claim than simply one regarding the removal of 
body parts. While the loss of body parts can have a major impact on an 
individual’s personal identity (perhaps closely related to their view of 
themselves), life events such as growing up, passing through the education 
system, and having children also have key roles to play in one’s 
development as a person. If the argument is to be taken as a treatise against 
fundamental change in this respect, we would be committed to the view that 
these significant life events which alter persons must not be allowed to take 
place. Even if the concept of change being employed is change for the 
worse, such a claim would make no sense.  
Another mistake inherent in a personality-affecting version of the 
separability thesis is the assumption that only things removed from the 
body can have such a dramatic effect on how a person’s life develops and 
on their functioning as a whole person. In order to see why this is the case 
let us think about Fred. His house has been repossessed and he has no 
money for other shelter or food. He is left homeless and has to sleep outside 
in the harsh winter without any food to sustain him. Eventually Fred dies 
from exposure and hunger. In such circumstances the house and food are as 
integral to Fred’s well-being and ultimate survival as are any of his organs 
and tissues. The effect of the removal from Fred of the house and the food 
to feed himself could ‘count as an attack on his personality, on himself, not 
as an attack on part of his worldly goods.’114 Should we, therefore, conceive 
of the house and food as incapable of being property in such cases? It is 
correct that all tokens in kind need not be considered the same,115 yet to hold 
that in this case would seem to needlessly overcomplicate the matter. If, as 
those such as Harris argue,116 the locus of property and ownership lies in 
rights of use and control, then the house and the food in this example will 
be the objects of someone’s property rights; the pertinent question is simply 
whose. If those property rights are not Fred’s, we might still want to stop 
the expropriation of the house and somehow ensure that Fred has adequate 
food to survive. The mere fact of property is not enough on its own to 
determine the moral right or wrong of the situation. This is not to argue that 
the property element is irrelevant: it is still a normatively important factor, 
but it has to be considered with other morally relevant facts. It might be, for 
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example, that the third parties who must forego on the house and food in 
order to prevent Fred’s death ought to be compensated for their loss in 
respect of these things. While we might think that property is important 
there are likely justifiable moral limits to the rights it entails. 
What then of the personhood-affecting version of the separability 
thesis: the claim that the kind of alteration which is relevant is one which 
extinguishes one’s personhood in its entirety? This interpretation is more 
plausible and Penner seems to link his argument to one regarding the 
removal of organs which would cause death. He contends that those organs 
that cause death upon their removal cannot be considered to be property;117 
the underlying supposition, presumably, being one about the undesirability 
of death in general (or perhaps by organ removal more specifically). Thus, 
the contention appears to be that if the organ cannot be separated from the 
person and leave one’s capacity for personhood intact, it cannot be 
property. The slightly extended claim might be something along the lines of 
it being, in general, a bad thing to permanently extinguish an individual’s 
personhood. If conceding property in the body permits individuals to do 
things which extinguish their personhood then we must not concede 
property. Take the example of the heart, the removal of which would 
ordinarily kill a person. Regarding the heart, the argument would be that if 
we concede that an individual’s heart is their property this commits us to 
allowing them to do what they wish with it, including arranging for its 
removal. However, whether or not such activities are permissible is not 
wholly dependent on whether vital organs are to be considered as property. 
For instance, we could conceive of different motivating factors which might 
impact on our moral assessment of such an act. Imagine three different 
scenarios: person A wants to donate his heart and lungs to his child with 
cystic fibrosis, person B owes a debt to a third party where the third party 
can reclaim what is owed through the sale of the heart, and person C simply 
wishes to commit suicide and wants to do this through having a vital organ 
removed so that it can be donated after his death.118 Each of these scenarios 
has different factors at play which would take a part in our moral 
deliberations as to the permissibility of the removal of the heart. Such 
activities are subject to other moral reasoning. It would not be the mere fact 
of property that would determine the moral permissibility in each case. The 
removal of the heart in these examples may be subject to property-
independent prohibitions.119 The oft-cited example which illustrates this is 
the knife: even though one’s knife is property, there a prohibitions (moral 
and legal) on using it to harm others. But for the wrong of harming others, I 
could use my knife to inflict injury.120 Justified restrictions on use, however, 
                                                 
117
 Penner (n 2) 122. 
118
 This is part of the premise in the Will Smith film Seven Pounds where the protagonist 
commits suicide in a way that ensures his organs will be donated following his death. See 
also D Wilkinson & J Savulescu, ‘Should we allow organ donation euthanasia: 
Alternatives for maximising the number and quality of organs for transplantation’ (2012) 
26 Bioethics 32.  
119
 Harris (n 2) 40-1. 
120
 See R Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (Basil Blackwell 1974) 171: ‘My property 
rights in my knife allow me to leave it where I will, but not in your chest.’ 
Quigley, M., ‘Property in Human Biomaterials: Separating Persons and 
Things?’, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies (2012) 32(4): 659-683 
20 
 
do not rest on whether the thing in question is an individual’s property or 
not. In the scenarios above, this means that even if the heart is deemed to be 
property, it does not necessarily give the owner free reign to do what he 
likes with it. We might find that, despite allowing that the heart is a 
particular person’s property, the harm of its removal (death) outweighs 
other considerations.  
As well as questioning the seeming underlying assumption that, in the 
case of the body, property would operate as the trumping justification in 
deciding questions of moral permissibility, we can also query another 
aspect of the reasoning employed. In only permitting property in bodily 
parts and tissues, the removal of which leaves ‘essentially the same 
person’,121 Penner is relying on the sense of separability which he has 
previously rejected. He claims, to distinguish property, the pertinent 
question is not whether the person is still the same person once they no 
longer have the thing under debate; instead, the focus ought to be on the 
question of whether other individuals who take on the relationship to the 
thing ‘essentially stand in the same position to it as the first person.’122 
Perhaps his presumption is that the answer is self-evident; when it comes to 
the whole body and vital organs others simply do not stand in the same 
position to them. However, such a claim depends on what is meant by 
another person having the same relationship to the thing. There are at least 
two possible interpretations of what is meant here. I touched upon these 
earlier when discussing the deceased body. The first might be that the 
object fulfils the same function for person B as it did for person A. The 
second might be that person B stands in the same position because all the 
rights, duties, powers, liabilities, and immunities, originally held by person 
A regarding the thing, have now been transferred to person B. Consider 
again Peter and Jane’s kidney donation and transplant. Even though the 
kidney transplanted from Peter is immunogenetically different from the rest 
of Jane’s body, it does, with the help of immunosuppressant medication, 
fulfil the same function as it did in Peter’s body. Jane would also have 
basically the same relationship to the kidney in the second sense since she 
would have acquired the same rights of use and control over the kidney as 
Peter had prior to the transplant.123 This would also be the case if it was a 
heart and not a kidney that had been transplanted and it is, therefore, not 
obvious that in the case of body parts and tissues the requirement for others 
to have the same relationship to the thing is useful. In order to reject the 
notion of vital organs as property, Penner has to fall back on the 
interpretation of separability which he previously rejected; that there must 
be no significant alteration in the person. I have already shown how this is 
problematic.  
Even if we accept the addendum that provided a part can be removed 
and does not fundamentally alter the person it can be property, this would 
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still admit many bodily parts and tissues into the realm of property. Such a 
restriction does not give us a way to easily identify which body parts are 
capable of being property. Take, for example, Peter’s left kidney, under 
either interpretation of the separability thesis it qualifies as property. It is 
separable and its removal would not of itself cause Peter’s death or any 
essential change to him as a person. What if it was actually removed; how 
would this affect the property status of his other kidney? It would still be 
separable and its removal would not cause his death, at least not straight 
away, and perhaps not for a long time if he is placed on dialysis. Neither 
could it really be said to essentially alter him as a person; yet there is a 
significant negative impact on his biological functioning. Is it then the case 
that only one of his kidneys is his property? This seems implausible. To 
answer in the positive would be to claim that the property status of organs 
and tissues is a function of any that have already been removed. This would 
give neither analytical nor practical clarity. 
 
5. Creating property: Intention & creation-without-wrong 
One response to my argument against the supposed normative force of 
separability would be to claim that it is not just separability which is 
important, but this in conjunction with the intention to use a body part, 
organ, or tissue as property. This is a plausible reading of Yearworth124 and 
is Hardcastle’s approach. He sees separation (detachment) as the legal 
prerequisite for the creation of property rights; it renders body parts capable 
of being subject to property rights, but more is needed to create and allocate 
those rights.125 Penner also appeals to intention to explain why body parts 
are not generally considered as property. He maintains that, even in the case 
of a separable organ such as the kidney, if it is not a person’s intention that 
the kidney be treated as property then it will not be considered as such. He 
uses the example of a person being stabbed in the kidney where that person 
had intended to sell their kidney. Their kidneys are not conceived of as 
property ‘unless one is actually considering selling them or giving them 
away or otherwise getting rid of them.’126 We are thus back to the 
suggestion that actual separation is not necessary just the mere 
technological possibility of detachment. Yet, if it is the intention of the 
person in which the particular body part resides that is determinative it is 
hard to see what work separability or detachment does normatively-
speaking. Nevertheless, Hardcastle’s ‘detachment plus intention’ criterion 
is worthy of exploration. 
He maintains that ‘[f]or property rights to be created under this 
principle it is necessary for a person to form and express an intention to use 
separated biological materials as property.’127 Ordinarily the consent of the 
source of the materials would constitute evidence of sufficient intent in this 
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respect because, upon removal of the materials in question, they would 
‘usually be aware . . . [that they] will be used as property for various 
purposes.’128 However, this is precisely what is at issue for those who 
advocate the initial (and automatic) allocation of property rights to the 
source. Up until recently, as far as the law pertaining to human materials 
was concerned, the one person deemed not to have property in separated 
tissues was the source of those materials. In England and Wales, most 
human tissue and biomaterials are governed by the provisions of the Human 
Tissue Act 2004.129 It is the consent provisions of this Act which 
purportedly protect individuals with regards to their tissues, but these 
provisions do not offer adequate protection of an individual’s interests in 
their bodily parts and tissues in a biotechnological age. The Act offers more 
protection for the deceased than the living because biomaterials from the 
living are exempt from Part 2 of Schedule 1 of the Act, meaning they can 
be used for clinical audit, education and training, performance assessment, 
public health monitoring, and quality assurance without the consent of the 
source.130 Where consent is not even needed it is unlikely that the source 
would be aware of the potential uses of their tissues in order to form the 
intention that they be considered as property. However, it could be argued 
that such uses are not those relevant to considerations of tissue as property, 
but the Act also contains a further more problematic exemption which 
applies to tissue removed from the living and deceased. Materials created 
outside the body do not count as ‘relevant materials’ for the purposes of the 
Act;131 thus, any cell lines created are not covered by the Act. This is 
remarkable on two counts; first, because of the considerable potential 
commercial value of cell lines and, secondly, because such cell lines are 
often indistinguishable from the donor tissue from which they were 
created.132 Again, exemption from consent provisions means that 
individuals are unlikely to be aware of this use for their tissues; 
consequently, if the intention requirement entails ‘conscious’ or ‘deliberate’ 
intent to create property then it will falter before it even gets going. 
Hardcastle recognises that there are difficulties with including 
intention as part of a normatively relevant criterion for creating and 
allocating property rights and considers those cases where (1) materials 
have been separated without consent and third parties form an intention to 
use as property, and (2) where materials are lawfully separated, but no such 
intention is formed. With regards to the first of these he notes that while the 
tort of battery covers the wrong of non-consensual separation, it has nothing 
to say about the allocation of property rights in the removed tissue should a 
third party form the requisite intention post-removal.133 He suggests, 
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drawing an analogy with the law relating to wild animals, that even though 
someone other than the source formed the intention, the source be allocated 
the property rights by default.134 The principle being that a third party 
should not benefit from the unlawful removal of the tissue. Similarly, in 
cases where there is no initial intention by the source to create property but 
a third party does so, it is the source who should be recognised as the holder 
of the property rights because of their ‘prior connection to [the 
materials].’135 Yet none of this shows that intention should play any role at 
all in the creation of property rights in human biomaterials; instead the 
relevant principle seems to be the prior connection of the source to their 
tissues.  
Perhaps recognising this, Harris argues that property rights are 
created in separated biomaterials ‘in virtue of creation-without-wrong.’136 
By this he means that there are specific circumstances where an individual 
ought to be considered as the owner of newly created resources where no 
wrong is done to third parties in doing so. In addition, he argues that this 
can only occur where trespassory rules are already in place which can 
protect the new creation; the creation does not require the imposition of 
‘novel trespassory obligations.’137 In relation to separated biomaterials no 
novel trespassory rules are created because ‘[t]hose rules which previously 
protected the whole of his body crystallize around what is taken from it.’138 
The first thing to note is that if one rejects, as I have here, a distancing or 
separability criterion as doing any coherent normative work, it is unclear 
why the rules which ‘crystallise’ around separated biomaterials are rules of 
the non-proprietary kind prior to separation but become property-like 
afterwards. The prior connection to the person principle may be the 
justification, but if we reject separability and if intention is not doing useful 
normative work something else must be going on to explain why property 
rights in separated materials should vest in the source. A possible answer is 
that there are proprietary rights in separated materials where there is a prior 
proprietary justification. Harris gives the example of a painter to illustrate 
his creation-without-wrong thesis: 
[A] painter who, for whatever reason, is regarded as justly 
owning his canvas and paints can, by virtue of the creation-
without-wrong argument, claim to be the owner of the picture 
he paints.139 
This example contains a key piece in the justification of the painter’s 
ownership of the picture; he already owns the materials he used to create it. 
It is, therefore, strange that, with respect to the person and their body, 
Harris rejects the idea of self-ownership because in so doing he denies the 
prior ownership that could provide the justificatory underpinning for a 
property claim in separated materials.  
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Despite the penetrance that the notion of separability has achieved in 
relation to the body and property in human tissue, I have demonstrated that 
even with modifications separability is weak and problematic. For those 
who would want to deny property in the body generally, but permit 
property in certain biomaterials, separability does not do the normative 
work required; contrariwise, it actually leads to the broad conclusion that 
much of the body is in fact capable of being considered as property. Even if 
we conjoin separability with another criterion such as intention or creation-
without-wrong, we are still left with an allocation problem. Commentators 
such as Harris and Hardcastle argue that the source of separated 
biomaterials ought to be allocated property rights therein140 and recent 
developments in case law have recognised such rights (at least in relation to 
sperm).141 But where the source of the biomaterials is not considered the 
owner prior to their removal, we have no prima facie reason for thinking 
that any new property rights created upon separation should vest in them.  
If my arguments in this article are correct, and a separability criterion 
does not give us sufficient grounds to draw a distinction between the whole 
intact body and its separated parts for proprietary purposes, two possible 
conclusions follow. First, if there are good reasons against recognising 
property in the whole body then these reasons may also extend to our 
separated biomaterials. A potential argument in this respect would be one 
from commodification; that recognising property rights is to wrongfully 
commodify the body.142 However, such an approach would have 
implications not only for the source of those materials, but for third parties 
as well. This is because it is unclear why allocating property rights to the 
source of the tissue would be to wrongfully commodify whereas allocating 
them to third parties (researchers, biotech companies, etc.) would not be to 
do so.143 A second alternative conclusion is this: it is correct that we 
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recognise property rights in the source over their separated materials, but 
the justification for doing so flows from the ownership that persons have 
over them prior to their separation. These rights inhere in persons over 
themselves, their bodies, and their parts regardless of whether they are 
detached and regardless of any intention to create property.144 Nevertheless, 
for those who do not like such an approach and do not want to bite the self-
ownership bullet the implication is clear; if they are to continue to hold that 
certain biomaterials can be property while also maintaining that other 
biomaterials and the whole intact body cannot, a justification more solid 





                                                                                                                           
(803). He argues that ‘there is a necessary connection between property rules and the 
protection of income rights’ which is not necessarily there for control rights (801) and this 
raises the spectre of commodification (799-800). If he is correct we still have to contend 
with the problem of why third parties are generally protected by property rules while the 
source of the biomaterials is not (the decision in Yearworth notwithstanding which was in 
essence a case about remedial action for a wrong which had already taken place).   
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